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Interrogating institutionalized establishments:  Urban-rural inequalities in China’s 
higher education 
Abstract 
China’s urban-rural disparities are a fundamental source of China’s overall 
educational inequalities. This article addresses this issue with data collected 
through interviews with members at various Chinese higher education institutions. 
It interrogates China’s current policies together with the social and political 
institutional arrangements that underlie them, and assesses the effectiveness of 
existing schemes to support higher education students. Based on China’s 
experience, it challenges market transition theory’s claim and debates the classical 
economic theory which postulates that expansion of education will reduce 
inequality. It argues that the expansion of education in China has aggravated 
inequality. Believing that the educational gap is only part of the overall picture of 
urban-rural disparities in China, of which many resulted from social institutional 
arrangements, it calls for changes to established institutions and a reconsideration 
of the role of private financing mainly through tuition fees. 
Keywords: Urban-rural disparities, Educational inequality, China, Higher 
Education 
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Introduction 
Since the economic reform started, two major changes in China’s higher education 
system have been enrolment expansion and tuition hike. While increased opportunities 
for higher education have raised the benefits for those who attend colleges and 
universities, an increasing financial burden of tuition fees has greatly hindered higher 
education for some college/university-worthy youth. There has been recent outcry over 
growing disparities in higher educational equality in China, especially between urban and 
rural areas. Higher education attainment closely relates to earlier access to publicly and 
privately supported education at lower levels as well as to the capacity of borrowing 
money to pay direct and indirect higher education costs. Equity challenges in China’s 
higher education finance need to be addressed urgently, as sustaining China’s rapid 
economic growth in the future depends in large part on the quantity and quality of its 
human resources. 
Educational inequalities are manifested in various forms in China. Yet, urban-
rural disparities are a fundamental source of China’s overall educational inequalities 
(Qian and Smyth 2008). Discussions tend to be confined to the matters at issue without 
much theoretical orientation (Cheng 2009), although Rawls’ (1971) principles of equality 
of opportunity are frequently cited (Ni 2008). Focusing on urban-rural disparities, this 
article addresses such a gap in the literature by interrogating China’s current policies 
together with the social and political institutional arrangements that underlie them. 
Based on national and institutional official statistics and Chinese and English 
literature, this article investigates the extent and trend of higher education inequalities in 
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China, with critical discussions on the concentration of wealth in urban centers and the 
impacts of this on higher education provision. It incorporates empirical data collected 
through interviews with administrative and academic staff at Chinese higher education 
institutions of various types: Shanghai Jiaotong University which is one of China’s oldest 
and most prestigious national flagship universities in Shanghai, Anhui Medical 
University which is located in the capital city of the relatively less developed Anhui 
province, and Maanshan Teacher’s College, a three-year tertiary institution at a medium-
size city in Anhui. These institutions were selected because they belong to different 
categories of research universities, provincial higher institutions and regional junior 
colleges respectively representing the larger scenario of China’s higher education system. 
They were accessible to the researchers during their fieldwork. 
Both focus group interviews and individual semi-structured interviews were 
conducted during June-July 2010 to elicit views from administrative and academic staff 
on urban-rural (in)equities in higher education. In each institution, seven to eight staff 
were interviewed, including two administrators at the university/college level in charge of 
student affairs and finance, one to two managers at the school level in charge of student 
affairs and recruitment, four faculty members. That means there were three focus group 
sessions in every case institution. 
This article first reviews China’s social and policy contexts to investigate the 
status of disparities with China’s recent major institutional reforms. It then assesses the 
effectiveness of existing schemes to support higher education students. Through some 
critical analyses of the underlying values of and responses to China’s longstanding urban-
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biased policies, this article critiques the priorities unfairly given to urban populations by 
Chinese public policy-makers. Locating China’s current practices into some social and 
policy contexts dating back decades ago, it argues that Chinese contemporary policies are 
becoming increasingly inappropriate in a transition from redistributive to market 
economy. 
 
Social and policy contexts 
Policies of educational justice are a kind of social action that requires to be observed 
within certain social, historical environment. China’s current educational disparities are 
resulted from its long-term policy options. When the communist republic was founded in 
1949, its new democratic education policy was in principle for the masses, representing 
the fundamental values of education equity. However, as a country with poor financial 
conditions and a huge population, educational development was not only confined to the 
political system and ideologies, but also hindered by its socio-economic development 
level and ready resources. Under the guidance of the new political ideologies, with aims 
at fast industrialization, China was confronted with a number of dilemmas and had to 
make hard policy choices. 
 
Elite education versus mass education 
Education for the broad masses was the basis for China’s policy-making in the early 
1950s. In addition to the expansion of working people’s educational rights, another 
urgent task of the new republic was, through formally institutionalized establishments, to 
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train professionals badly needed for economic development and national defense 
(People’s Daily 1950, p. 1). The dilemma faced by education which was supposed to be 
open to workers and peasants was vacillation between equity and efficiency, a matter of 
mass or elite education (Qian 1950). The choice had implications for educational policy-
making to decide the priority between basic and higher education. During the 1950s and 
1960s centered on implementing the five-year plans of national economic building and 
the Soviet-model industrialization, China’s actual policy opted to elite education. 
National investment concentrated on higher education, whose recipients enjoyed tuition 
fee waiving, living stipends and free medical care. The distribution of higher education 
institutions and disciplinary structure were heavily imbalanced with particular emphases 
on major capital cities and science and technology subjects, linking directly to heavy 
industry and national defense. A number of institutions were selected by the government 
to invest focally. They were designated as key-point institutions, under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Education or other ministries. There was strict selection at every level 
within the system to secure the quality of the best students. 
Looking back on such a policy option, its pros and cons become evident. The 
most obvious advantage was to provide strong intellectual and personnel support for 
industrialization and national defense. Its major problem was the extremely imbalanced 
distribution of educational resources, causing longstanding ignorance of basic education, 
damages to the majority people’s educational rights, and a huge educational gap between 
urban and rural areas. With its focus on higher education, China prioritized efficiency and 
the instrumental value of education. The allocation of educational resources was based 
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entirely on national development goals that prioritized fast industrialization (People’s 
Daily 1952), with little consideration of local needs, causing regional disparities. There 
were few national key-point higher institutions in central and western regions. The 
monopoly of educational resources by and the limited financial capacity of the central 
government determined the unfortunate combination of stress on higher education and 
weak rural education. 
 
Mao Zedong’s ‘educational revolutions’ 
During the initial days of the republic, the broad masses of workers and peasants were 
endowed with educational rights directly by political revolution. The way to eliminate 
illiteracy and to universalize education was also in a form of revolution-strong political 
campaigns with large-scale mass movements. There was an idealistic expectation that 
popularization of education would rapidly change the educational outlook of Chinese 
workers and peasants. Such emphases on basic education for the majority people 
immediately contradicted with the goal to train specialists to develop heavy industry. As 
the leaning to the Soviet Union went further (Gao 1996), the Soviet model of planned 
economy and a highly centralized higher education system were established. The quest 
for quality and higher standards were prioritized and the selection of cadres from 
workplaces to be sent directly to universities was also terminated. The stresses on ‘higher 
standards’ stopped children of workers and peasants from going to universities and even 
schools (China National Institute for Educational Research 1983). 
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Mao Zedong, however, strongly opposed the overwhelming dominance by Soviet-
style education,
1
 and initiated ‘educational revolutions’ in the 1960s based on his 
educational ideals and values. His main attention was to the educational rights of working 
people’s children, especially in rural areas. He tried to achieve these goals through 
smashing up examinations, shortening length of schooling, relaxing the limits for 
university entry, and devolving administrative power to lower levels of government to 
utilize multiple sources and methods to develop education. His thoughts and efforts to 
reform education continued well into the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In retrospect, 
despite his passionate concern for educational justice, especially the rights of average 
workers and peasants, his revolutionary way to break and even surmount the 
accumulation of cultural capital in order for the disadvantaged to achieve dramatic 
changes was far from successful. Its actual effect was a great damage to the majority 
people’s educational rights. Additionally, his personal obsession with family origin led to 
wide-ranging deprivation of non-working class people’s educational rights, and created 
injustice of other sorts. One legacy of his revolutionary approach might be the possibility 
to utilize institutionalized power of the state to promote justice in education. 
 
Dengist discriminatory xianfu theory 
                                                 
1
 Due to political considerations of both domestic and international situation, Mao Zedong initiated 
deStalinization in February 1956, and expressed strong anti-Sovietization attitude. (Research Institute of 
Chinese Communist Party (1994)” Selections of the Important Documents of Chinese Communist Party 
after the Foundation of China” Volume 8, pp. 231-238 (in Chinese). In reality, however, he displayed great 
ambiguity. 
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China’s rapid expansion of inequality is directly resulted from the economic reforms in 
1978. During the reforms, the economic system was redirected to the market and the 
opening of the economy was limited to specific areas, such as special economic zones in 
coastal regions. Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Lectures in 1992 gave further impetus to 
the transition from redistributive, egalitarian to market-based, meritocratic system 
(Hannum 1999), leading to substantial changes in the income inequality structure. 
The reforms set macroeconomic growth as the first priority, even if this sacrificed 
equality of income distribution and opportunities, as illustrated by Dengist xianfu theory, 
which states, “Allow some people and areas to get rich first.” Such discriminatory 
treatment justifies income disparity, embraces the penetration of the market mechanism 
into the Chinese economy, and accelerates income gap between urban and rural areas. 
The xianfu theory encourages marketization (Okushima and Uchimura 2005). The reform 
policy based on Dengist xianfu theory treats cities and countryside unevenly.  
 
A cost-sharing financing mechanism 
Until the late 1990s, China’s public spending on higher education was high by 
international comparison. Government allocation per student was generous until the mid-
1990s. During the past years, the government has implemented a series of reforms to 
reach a financing mechanism where the cost of higher education is shared between the 
central, regional and local governments, as well as with society and individual students. 
Public spending per student has been decreasing while educational costs per student have 
increased substantially. Public funding of higher education accounted for 29% in 1984 
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and 19% in 1994 of total public education expenditures (World Bank 1997). Government 
subsidies have declined as a share of total financing from 64.6% in 1990 to 53.1% in 
1998. The share of financing contributed by tuition fee rose from 15.06% in 1996 to 
29.29% in 2003 (Du 2007). 
For instance, one respondent made the following observation:  
 
Although we are a national key university, only half of our financial resources 
come from the central government. Because of our strengths in engineering 
and applied scientific research, we get a lot from the industry. …We charge 
5,000 RMB tuition fees per student per year. This is the same as many 
provincial institutions. ...Our tuition fees account less than half of the avenue 
generated by the University. (Shanghai Jiaotong University, Interview-1) 
 
Policies of marketization, decentralization and privatization since the 1980s have 
significant equity implications, and increase inequalities in access across regions, 
especially as the poor regions have reduced capacity to finance education at all levels. 
The private cost of higher education is substantial. The average cost per student to study 
and live on campus for an academic year far exceeds the average family annual income 
of the country. In 2004, higher education tuition fees grew to 5,000 RMB, 
accommodation costs increased to 1,000-1,200 RMB, a student’s living costs rose to 
4,000-5,000 RMB, making the total expense of university study around 40,000-50,000 
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RMB, which amounted to 4.2 and 13.6 years net income for an urban dweller and a rural 
resident respectively (Guo 2010). 
 
Manifestations of inequalities in China’s higher education 
Inequalities in China’s higher education remain structural. They are reflected in 
various dimensions of China’s higher education system (Wang 2011; Li 2011; Li and 
Bray 2006; Yang 2010), caused by a variety of factors (Liu et al. 2012; Wang 2010; Zhou 
and Chung 2012).The disparities are manifested particularly strikingly between urban and 
rural areas in terms of access to higher education. Urban students are over represented in 
higher education while their share in the population is the opposite. Urban students are 
more heavily weighted to the upper social strata than their rural counterparts, with better-
educated parents in high skilled occupations and a better family economic situation. 
China’s present situation is that students from better-off urban families are well prepared 
to enter high quality public universities which are also the cheapest, while much 
disadvantaged rural students are more likely to attend poor quality second-tier or private 
institutions which charge high fees. 
China’s urban-biased enrolment policy has long been strong. Since 1962, a higher 
proportion of children from urban and better off families go to university than among 
rural and low-income students. Recent changes in public financing and increasing 
reliance on tuition fees further reinforce this trend.  
 
Opportunities for receiving higher education 
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China’s urban-rural inequalities in higher education are directly resulted from its urban-
rural dual social structure, a political institutional arrangement built on an unfair 
household registration (hukou) system. They are also an accumulative result of those in 
primary and secondary schools. For decades, higher education opportunities remain 
highly controlled by the central government and their distribution has been extremely 
imbalanced. The planned enrolment figures of higher education institutions are 
distributed with privileges given to major centers such as Beijing and Shanghai nationally 
and to the capital cities within provinces (Zhang and Kanbur 2003).  
         The admission system of higher education institutions remains centrally planned 
and segmented based on the administrative and geographic unit of provinces and 
municipalities. Each institution is designated a quota of students by the central 
government. The nationwide admission system is divided by province/municipality, with 
a quota unevenly distributed to each province/municipality. For instance, in 2004, 
provincial enrollment reached 26.82% at Peking University, 51.94% at Fudan University, 
67.29% at Zhongshan University, 53.85% at Wuhan University, 20.81% at the Central 
South University, and 39.12% at Sichuan University (Wang 2011).
2
  
                                                 
2
 The striking differences of percentages of local students between Peking University and Fudan University 
are mainly due to China’s unbalanced distribution of national flagship universities. Even Shanghai is the 
nation’s economic (and financial) center, its concentration of higher education resources is far behind 
Beijing, although it is second only to Beijing. For example, Beijing hosts eight “985” and twenty-six “211” 
universities, while Shanghai has only four and nine respectively. Precisely because of the fewer numbers, 
the Shanghai municipal government has more bargaining power with the central government about the 
quota of local students in those major universities located within the city, as a reward to its financial 
support of co-constructing the four “985” universities.   
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Research repeatedly confirms the negative impacts of reforms on educational 
opportunities for rural population in China (Hannum 1999; Tsang 1994). While the 
disparities are widely acknowledged, the actual situation has been described differently. 
A large-scale study undertaken jointly by the World Bank and the Chinese Ministry of 
Education in April 1998 surveyed 70,000 students enrolled respectively in 1994 and 1997 
at 37 universities at various levels (Zhang 2004). It showed that on average the difference 
of educational opportunities between urban and rural areas was 5.8 times nationwide, 
with 8.8 and 3.4 times respectively in national key-point and provincial universities. This 
was bigger than the income disparity of 2.8 times. Fan’s (2008) research shows the 
urban-rural access opportunity differences in various higher education institutions after 
the expansion of enrollment (see Table 1 below). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Zhang and Liu (2005) reveal an inverted pyramid shape of the disparities among 
different social strata in Chinese higher education, based on the data of the undergraduate 
students in the 1990s collected from Peking and Tsinghua Universities shown in Table 2 
below. They found that the more prestigious the institutions are the lower percentage of 
rural students is. The trend continued until the mid-2000s, as shown in Figure 1.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
As family financial situation becomes increasingly important in determining 
young people’s access to higher education, the number of students from rural background 
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decreases in both the peak and the bottom of the hierarchy of Chinese higher education 
institutions, as shown by Tables 3 and 4 below: 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
This trend was also frequently confirmed by our respondents, as shown below: 
  
About 20-30% of our students are from countryside. This proportion is not 
bad for an institution like us. We have a high proportion of Shanghai local 
students.  (Shanghai Jiaotong University, Interview-1) 
 
More than half of our students are from Shanghai, and the rest are from all 
parts of China. …For a long time, our local students accounted for 25%. After 
reforms, Shanghai government wants value for their money and requires half 
and half. Now about 60% are local. (Shanghai Jiaotong University, Interview-
3) 
 
The situation is different in provincial institutions. Both the other selected case 
study institutions have a high proportion of rural students, as shown by the following 
remarks:  
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We are a regional university serving our local community. The bulk of our 
students are from rural, workers and peasants families. (Anhui Medical 
University, Interview-1) 
 
Most of our students are from rural, less developed areas. (Maanshan 
Teacher’s College, Interview-3) 
  
However, a closer scrutiny of their situation shows that there have been some 
interesting changes to the proportion of rural students in relation to their peers from urban 
family background: while Anhui Medical University has managed to maintained its high 
percentage of rural students (see Table 3), the proportion of rural students at Maanshan 
Teacher’s College has substantially dropped from 60% in 1995 to 30% in 2010, as shown 
by Table 4. 
 
Enrolled students from poor rural families 
The issue of university students from impoverished rural areas began to catch people’s 
attention since 1997 when Chinese universities began to charge students tuition and 
accommodation fees. Rising tuition fees have substantially increased the difficulties of 
poor rural families in sending their children to universities. The total private cost of one 
student for a year in university during 2000-2001 exceeded an urban resident’s annual 
income and was 4 times that of a rural dweller. In 2006, undergraduate programs in 
science and liberal arts in independent colleges charged 12,217 and 12,034 RMB 
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respectively, and 11,100 and 10,500 RMB in private institutions, doubled those by the 
nation’s most prestigious institutions (Zang and Shen 2010). 
For those already enrolled, it is extremely difficult to complete their university 
education. During 2004-2005 academic year, 2.63 million (19%) of the 13.5 million 
enrolled students were from families with financial difficulties, and 1.22 million (9%) 
very seriously (Wu 2008). According to a survey conducted by China Youth 
Development Foundation in 2006, about 26% (4.05 million) of the total national 
enrolment of 15.61 million by August 2005 were from families with financial difficulties. 
The average amount needed for a student’s basic living was around 6780 RMB while the 
average income of their families was 4756 RMB. Around two-thirds students family’s 
income fell short of expenditure. (Zhang 2008).  
The Chinese governments at various levels and higher education institutions have 
worked together to have some policies on stage. However, within a globalised context of 
corporate culture in higher education worldwide, ‘efficiency’ has been given the highest 
priority in China (Yang 2004). Such a policy orientation seems to be justified when the 
central authority decides to hand responsibility to other tiers and new actors, especially 
individual institutions and local governments (Bray and Borevskaya, 2001). 
It is worthwhile mentioning that in the tough competition with their peers of 
urban family background, rural students remain at a disadvantage throughout their entire 
education including their employment at graduation, as the following comments 
demonstrate: 
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Most students from countryside, except the very top ones, have much more 
limited chance to compete with their fellow students from cities to find 
employment at graduation, because they do not have the same social and 
family connections in cities. (Anhui Medical University, Interview-6) 
 
Existing schemes to support higher education students 
According to the Higher Education Law brought into effect on January 1999 (Standing 
Committee of the People’s Congress 1998), students from families with financial 
difficulties may apply for subsidies or reduction of or exemption from tuition fees 
(Article 54). The state establishes scholarships, and encourages higher education 
institutions, enterprises, organizations and individuals to establish scholarships in a 
variety of ways in accordance with relevant regulations to award students of good 
character and scholarship (Article 55).  A range of financial assistance measures have 
thus been introduced nationwide. 
The loans system was piloted in 1996 and fully implemented in 1999, two years 
after the introduction of the official unitary tuition charge. Endorsed by the State Council, 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and the People’s Bank of China 
launched the loan program. A total of 700 million RMB was set aside to help cash-poor 
students in 136 institutions, but only in urban centers including Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Chongqing, Wuhan, Shenyang, Xi’an and Nanjing. The program was expanded 
to more areas over the next few years, targeting students from poor families and in rural 
areas. Loan recipients were required to repay loans with discounted interest within four 
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years of graduation, though the loan system offers students a 50% discount on interest. 
The amounts vary depending on the levels of tuition fees charged by different institutions 
and regions, with a maximum of 8,000 RMB for one student a year. 
Implementation of the student loan program only started in early 2000. By March, 
the loans taken had only absorbed 1.3% of the 700 million RMB budgeted for the 
program, and only 0.2% of the total students with serious financial difficulties received 
loans due to the reluctance of the banks and the complexity of loan procedures (Huang 
2005). Localities outside the eight capital cities must initiate agreements with banks 
within their jurisdictions to provide loans for local students. Therefore, actual start of 
student loan programs and their detailed regulations differed among various regions. In 
relatively less affluent areas, local governments launched their student loan programs 
after 2001. The maximum amount of a student loan was reduced to around 6,000 RMB 
per academic year, with an eligibility quota of less than 20% of student population. 
Traditionally Chinese people are reluctant to have debts (Johnstone et al. 1998). 
While such values are still visible as some students’ families try to avoid borrowing as 
long as they can manage, a recent change in students’ attitude towards debt is evident. 
They no longer think that ‘taking loan is embarrassing’, and exhibit confidence in their 
ability to repay loans in the future. Huang’s (2005) study of the Southwest region showed 
that the loan program had reached 32% of the students, and covered less than 50% of the 
costs of those students. 
There have been problems with the implementation of the loans scheme because 
of the high default rate. Owing to high subsidy element of the loans and the resulting low 
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profit for providers, the loans are poorly managed. Furthermore, banks in Beijing and 
Guangzhou reported that at least 10% and 38% university graduates respectively were in 
arrears with their payment (Du and Mao 2003). In 2004, a new system of student loans 
was initiated to guarantee the continuation of student loans. In the new system, the 
government subsidizes the interest before the student’s graduation from university. 
Students pay back the loans within six years after graduation but there is no threshold for 
repaying. To mitigate the risk of bad payment to the bank, the government and university 
jointly set up a Risk Compensation Fund for the bank, approximately 6% of the contract 
value. Government and university pay 50% of the compensation fund, respectively, to the 
contract bank. In July 2006, the Ministry of Education and the Bank of China finalized 
the financial arrangements between government, university and bank (Sun and Barrientos 
2009). 
China’s existing loan schemes are often criticized for the small proportion of 
students they have covered and for their low level of support (Huang 2005; Sun and 
Barrientos 2009). In 2008, enrolment in China’s regular higher education institutions 
totaled 20.1 million. Among them, 4.74 million were from low-income families. Only 
0.67 million were able to receive loans (Cui 2012). According to Long and Li (2009), 
16.88% of Chinese students were on loans. Zang and Shen (2010) reported only less than 
10% students are on loans. Due to the lack of social trust and effective penalties for 
dodging creditors, compensation for costs and risks for banks cannot be guaranteed. 
There have been difficult discussions and negotiations between higher institutions and 
banks. Moreover, loan schemes favor the enrolments in public regular higher institutions. 
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Loans are less accessible for those students in private institutions and independent 
colleges. 
Another major part of the support system is a scholarship scheme established for 
all undergraduate candidates in 1986-1987 and later extended to postgraduate candidates 
in 1991. Compared with loan programs, the impact of scholarships are more limited 
especially for rural students. This is due to the number and amount of available 
scholarships which reach only to a small number of best academic performers. Introduced 
in May 2002, the National Scholarship Scheme of scholarships targets 45,000 students 
annually, and provides up to 6,000 RMB per year per student, with academic merit rather 
than family financial difficulties as its foremost criterion. Scholarships are generally 
modest in amount, and benefit only a limited proportion of students. They are more 
accurately seen as a subsidy than a grant, and often beyond the reach of many in bad need 
of support. 
 
Findings from fieldwork 
Our empirical data show that while expansion has overall created more opportunities for 
some students to receive higher education, China’s contemporary higher educational 
policies based on established institutional arrangements have led to some further 
inequalities between jurisdictions and  urban-rural disparities.  It is also evident that 
tuition fees are causing great financial burden to many rural students, despite that loans 
and scholarships amend urban-rural inequality to a limited extent. Here, we have 
summarized our major findings based mainly on the remarks made by our interviewees: 
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Impacts of expansion on higher education access  
As shown by our Shanghai Jiaotong University case, while it is in general difficult for rural 
students to enter flagship universities, some rural students have successfully managed to get 
there. They are usually highly intelligent and industrious. Once they are admitted into such 
institutions, they are often well serviced by national and institutional schemes to complete their 
studies. As one respondent put it: 
 
Our annual undergraduate admission is around 4,000. About 20-30% is from rural poor 
families. While one can question the percentage as still a minority, we believe this is quite 
substantial already. (Shanghai Jiaotong University Interview-1) 
 
Such comments were confirmed by another interviewee from a much di9fferent 
institution, as follows; 
 
Access to higher education for rural students has been considerably increased after the 
expansion. Our experience shows typically the large situation in relatively less developed 
regions. (Anhui Medical University Interview-2) 
 
Impacts of admission policies on higher education access  
In general, equality has been better achieved in undergraduate admissions which are based mainly 
on scores of the national entrance examination. However, some question the social justice of the 
examination, especially because there have been regional variations and disparities. For instance, 
students in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces tend to score much more highly than their peers in 
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other provinces. Meanwhile, students in major cities such as Tianjin and Shanghai can get into 
universities with much lower entry scores. When asked for comments about this, one respondents 
based in Shanghai remarked in a defensive way; 
 
These students (those local students enrolled with lower entry scores) have their own 
strengths such as better English proficiency and a higher level of all-round development. 
(Shanghai Jiaotong University, Interview-7) 
 
Our respondents from a regional university explained further: 
 
It is true that equality in higher education remains a tough issue. Within a national context of 
expansion, different situations are in different areas. In our province, if one scores over 500 in 
the national entrance examination, s/he can never enter the good universities in Beijing or 
Shanghai, can only choose low-tier institutions instead.  (Anhui Medical University, 
Interview-2) 
 
Impacts of tuition fees on aspiration of rural students to higher education 
With the great difficulty in receiving high quality tertiary education, there has 
been wide spread common practice in rural areas that tertiary studies are useless, as 
explained by an interviewee below: 
 
There is a huge imbalance between investment and return. If young rural people cannot 
get admitted into good universities, they would rather give up higher education and 
travel to cities to find jobs. Otherwise, it would be difficult for them to get satisfactory 
return from the education they receive from low-tier institutions. Educational costs are 
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getting increasingly high, right from basic education. (Shanghai Jiaotong University, 
Interview-7) 
Another respondent, an established professor, echoed this judgment, with more 
positive view about China’s financial support system: 
 
Tuition fees have little impact on those from middle-class or above, but more on the very 
poor. However, with the (financial) support policy, things are getting much better. (Anhui 
Medical University, Interview-2) 
 
Loan and scholarship enhance higher education chances for rural students 
Although students’ opportunities to secure their scholarships and other forms of financial 
assistance vary, such schemes have enhanced higher education chances for some rural 
students. The positive signs of China’s existing support schemes are clearly demonstrated 
by the following comments: 
  
In our University, those eligible for financial assistance never have problems 
in getting them. (Shanghai Jiaotong University, Interview-1) 
 
Due to the financial support measures such as students’ loan, scholarship, aids and grants, and 
part-time work arrangements on campus, all students enrolled in this university could pay the 
tuition fees and are affordable to higher education. Overall, the government has been doing a 
reasonably good job. (Anhui Medical University, Interview-3) 
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Students’ loan scheme is very helpful for supporting rural students and those 
who are from socio-economic disadvantageous families. (Maanshan 
Teacher’s College, Interview-1) 
 
Here, once again, the situation varies from institution to institution. The general 
scenario is that financial issues are much less serious for those admitted into the most 
prestigious universities, as demonstrated below:   
  
Due to our status, we promise our students their educational opportunity 
wouldn’t be affected by tuition charges. (Shanghai Jiaotong University, 
Interview-1) 
 
The same view was expressed by Shanghai Jiaotong Interviews-3-4-5, 
who further pointed out that 12% students would apply for financial assistance, 
and usually could succeed. This was further confirmed by a female teacher at 
Shanghai Jiaotong who has a PhD from Japan: 
 
Inequalities are already serious at primary and secondary levels. They just 
continue in higher education. However, this is not an issue here as we have 
got enough donations (mainly from alumni) to provide every student we admit 
with sufficient financial support. (Shanghai Jiaotong University, Interview-2) 
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We don’t have many applications for financial assistance. Scholarships and 
grants are sufficient here. Indeed, we have more than enough. About half of 
our students can get certain kinds of fellowships. (Shanghai Jiaotong 
University, Interviews-6 & 7) 
 
It is not surprising that our two other case study institutions are in very 
different situations. However, even based on their experience, it becomes 
increasingly evident that China’s schemes to support higher education students 
are working better, as one respondent from Anhui Medical University says: 
 
Tuition fees affected some people’s educational opportunity. But recently 
with various assistance including scholarships, grants and loans, tuition fees 
are increasingly much less a problem. (Anhui Medical University, Interview-
1) 
 
 
 
However, the real situation might be much layered, as described by 
another academic from the same institution who also pointed at the institutional 
differentiation: 
 
Scholarship opportunities are too limited. Institutions like us are very different 
from those major ones in Beijing and Shanghai. Most of our students are from 
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rural background. We don’t have enough scholarships to meet their need. 
(Anhui Medical University, Interview-2) 
 
Understandably, institutions at the bottom of the Chinese system are in an even 
more different situation, with much heavier reliance on financial assistance, as shown 
below. However, our empirical data dispute the aforementioned criticism. Indeed, few 
respondents complained much about China’s existing schemes to support higher 
education students. 
  
About 69% of our students receive certain kind of financial assistance. 
(Maanshan Teacher’s College, Interview-3) 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In China’s long history, higher education belonged to high class. Birth origin determined 
an individual’s social status. After a variety of radical actions taken by the communist 
government to fight against such traditions for decades, today’s Chinese higher education 
has once again become an institution of social stratification. Mao’s attempt to fashion a 
mass-based educational system catering to the needs of the peasantry is being 
transformed into a triumph of middle-class ideology (Kelly and Liu 1998).  
The above account challenges the claim by market transition theory that market 
will replace state redistribution as the primary allocative mechanism of resources (Nee  
and Matthews 1996). While increasing earnings returns to education are well 
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acknowledged (Wu and Xie 2003), the continuing advantage of those in position of 
influence within the Chinese system indicates that political capital still matters and social 
structure in China is more resilient to change than it seems (Walder 1996). It also debates 
the classical economic theory which postulates that expansion of education will reduce 
inequality by increasing the supply of skilled workforce (Kuznets 1955; Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 1997). Rather than contributing to income equality, the expansion of education 
in China has not reduced inequality (Hannum and Xie 1998). 
The educational gap among urban and rural segments reflects both the widespread 
disparity in the level of economic development and the longstanding historical and socio-
cultural differences between cities and countryside. Students from rural areas face strong 
structural inequality in educational opportunity (Postiglione 2006).  
The educational gap between urban and rural populations is institutionally 
legitimized and further enhanced as reforms go on. It is only part of the overall picture of 
urban-rural disparities in China, of which many resulted from social institutional 
arrangements, especially the longstanding dual structure featured by the great divide 
between cities and countryside and inherited from the planned system.  There are 
multiple reasons within the education system as well. There is a tendency to prioritize 
urban education as evidenced by China-specific key-point schools ranging from basic to 
higher education (Hannum 1999). Another factor is China’s discriminatory university 
student admission policy---admission system based on quotas, which gives preferences to 
students from cities (Yuan 2003). Meanwhile, there has not been much differentiation in 
tuition fees charged by national key-point and average provincial universities. Indeed, 
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some low-status private universities and colleges charge much more. Rural residents thus 
have been doubly discriminated against: paying higher fees to receive education of lower 
quality. 
This study has evident implications for China’s future reform policies for 
marketization and privatization. The growing educational inequality especially at the 
upper level of schooling will fuel greater earnings inequality between urban and rural 
communities (Nee and Cao 2004). The government has just started to tackle this only 
because it now sees the possible grave consequences of political instability (Lin 2010; 
UNDP 2005). However, how successful its response could be remains highly doubtful as 
this is not only a challenge to its imagination and administrative skills, but a challenge to 
the power of many of those within the system. It also calls for a reconsideration of the 
role of private financing mainly through tuition fees. 
The above discussions of China’s experience also shed light on the practices in 
some other Asian societies with similar issues of shortage of educational opportunities for 
rural population and imperfection of institutional development in the process of 
marketization. For such societies, there is an urgent need for changes to established 
institutions. Researchers are duty-bound to alert policy makers to the existence of 
widespread educational discrimination against rural people. This becomes an arduous and 
pressing task in a context of globalization, something always used by governments to 
legitimize their emphasis on economic growth over the development of new social 
relations, including more equal distribution of goods and services and educational 
opportunities. 
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Table 1.  Urban-rural access opportunity differences in various higher education 
institutions after the expansion of enrollment, 2004 
University Type Urban-rural Access Opportunity Rate 
Project 985 institution* 2.42 
Public key institution 1.85 
Public ordinary institution 1.41 
Public specialist institution 1.56 
Private institution 3.85 
Private specialist institution 2.76 
Independent institution 4.97 
Source: Fan, M..C. (2008). Research on urban-rural difference in China’s higher 
education opportunity, Education Science, 24(1), 63–67 (in Chinese). Cited from Wang, 
Houxiong (2011), Access to higher education in China: Differences in opportunity, 
Frontiers of Education in China, 6 (2), 227-247. 
Note: *Project 985 institutions refer to the first tier public universities, project 985 is a 
Chinese government policy launched in May of May 1998 at the centennial anniversary 
of Peking University.    
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Table 2. Percentages of rural students of total undergraduates at Peking and Tsinghua 
Universities, 1990-1999 
Year Peking University Tsinghua University 
Total 
Enrolments 
Rural 
Students 
Percentages Total 
Enrolment
s 
Rural 
Students 
Percentages 
1990 - - - 1994 433 21.7 
1991 - - 18.8 2031 385 19.0 
1992 1810 403 22.3 2080 381 18.3 
1993 910 168 18.5 2210 352 15.9 
1994 - - 20.1 2203 407 18.5 
1995 2089 436 20.9 2241 451 20.1 
1996 2164 425 19.6 2298 431 18.8 
1997 2211 420 19.0 2320 452 19.5 
1998 2240 415 18.5 2462 510 20.7 
1999 2425 396 16.3 2663 506 19.0 
Source: Zhang & Liu (2005). 
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world-class universities, mber of renowned high-level research institutions;  
Figure 1: Ratio of new students by household registration in Peking University, 2000-
2005  
 
 
Source: Liu et al. (2012). 
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Table 3. Urban and rural undergraduate students at Anhui Medical University  
Year Urban Students  Rural Students  
 Enrollment 
Number 
Percentages Enrollment 
Number 
Percentages 
2000 2871 54.98 2351 45.02 
2005 5507 60.46 3601 39.54 
2006 5856 59.52 3983 40.48 
2007 6447 58.26 4618 41.74 
2008 7006 57.12 5259 42.88 
2009 7582 55.48 6083 44.52 
Source: Based on on-site collected information in July 2010  
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Table 4.  Urban and rural students enrolled in 3-year teacher training programs at 
Maanshan Teacher’s College  
Year Urban Students  Rural Students  
 Enrollment 
Number 
Percentages Enrollment 
Number 
Percentages 
1995 274 40 411 60 
2000 262 52.09 241 47.91 
2005 2177 59.99 1452 40.01 
2006 2962 60 1975 40 
2007 3402 60 2268 40 
2008 4259 70 1825 30 
2009 4546 70 1948 30 
2010 4510 70 1933 30 
Source: Based on on-site collected information in July 2010  
 
